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Women as Litigants*
By STUART S. NAGEL**
and
LENORE I WEITZMAN***
THE purpose of this article is to describe how women are treated rela-
tive to men in criminal, personal injury, and divorce cases-three fields
which constitute most of the trial court litigation in American courts.
The findings presented will generally be based on quantitative nation-
wide data. The article will particularly examine the extent to which
women are disfavored, favored, or treated neutrally as criminal de-
fendants, personal injury plaintiffs, and divorce litigants. It will also
discuss some of the effects of having more women as jurors and judges
on the relative treatment of male and female litigants.
Women as Crumnal Defendants
In the literature dealing with women's rights, researchers have in-
dicated that "in several states higher penalties are imposed on a woman
who commits a crime than on a man who commits the same crime."'
These statements, however, have been based on those few state statutes
and appellate test cases which describe the law on the books rather
than the law in action. Empirical data has been needed to show how
much time the average woman spends in prison as compared to the
time spent by the average man, or at least showing the length of sen-
* This research is one of a series of policy science studies on measuring and
achieving effects of alternative legal policies partly financed by the National Science
Foundation grant GS-2875. The NSF is not responsible for the results.
* * Law and Social Science Fellow, Russell Sage Program, Yale Law School. On
leave as Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois. Member of the Illinois
Bar.
*** Law and Social Science Fellow, Russell Sage Program, Yale Law School.
Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of California at Davis commencing au-
tumn, 1971.
1. Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority- Modern Trends in the Law Concern-
ing Women's Rights, 55 CoRNL L. Rav. 262 (1970). See also L. KANowrrz,
WOMEN AND THE LAw 167-72 (1969) [hereinafter cited as KANowrrz1; Schulder, Does
the Law Oppress Women? in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL, 139, 153 (R. Morgan ed.
1970).
tences given on conviction for various crimes to the average woman
as compared to the average man.
Likewise, the literature dealing with discrimination against women
has often drawn analogies between American society's treatment of
women and of blacks.2 These analogies may be valid in some fields
like employment discrimination where one can sometimes explain both
racial and sexual discrimination in terms of the desire of workers to
limit competition and the desire of employers to have cheap labor, but
the similarities between racism and sexism do not necessarily apply to
all fields. Empirical data has also been needed to test the analogy's
applicability to the treatment of blacks and women as criminal defend-
ants by comparing black-white sentencing practices with male-female
sentencing practices. Additionally, data on presentencing treatment
(e.g., being released on bail or receiving a jury trial) might provide
valuable comparative insights.
In 1962 Lee Silverstein of the American Bar Foundation (ABF)
arranged for attorneys and court personnel in a scientifically deter-
mined sample of 194 counties located in all 50 states to systematically
compile data on 11,258 criminal cases. 3  The data was primarily de-
signed to study procedures for providing attorneys to indigent defend-
ants. Silverstein, however, included many other variables in his data
such as the race, sex, and age of the defendants and the treatment they
received at all stages of the criminal justice process from the preliminary
hearing through the sentencing stage.
Two basic patterns of discrimination emerge when one uses the
ABF data to correlate the background characteristics of criminal de-
fendants with their criminal procedure treatment while holding constant
the crime charged.4 One pattern, which might be called the disad-
vantaged or disfavored pattern, applies to indigent, black, or elemen-
tary-educated defendants. This pattern involves unfavorable treatment
at virtually all stages of the criminal justice process including (1) re-
2. E.g., C. BIRD, BORN FEMALE 110-25 (Pocket Book rev. ed., 1971); K. MILL-
Err, SEXUAL POLITICS 23-58 (1970).
3. Some of the data was the basis for L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN
CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS (1965) in which the data compilation
methods are described at pages 175-79, 183-86, and 207-12. The data can now be ob-
tained on magnetic tape or punched cards from the Inter-University Consortium for
Political Research at Ann Arbor, Michigan.
4. For further details on these and other disparities in criminal procedure see S.
NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 81-112 (1969) [herein-
after cited as NAGEL]. Those pages also provide some reinforcing data from the fed-
eral courts, but the sample of women in the federal criminal cases used is too small to be
meaningful.
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ceiving a preliminary hearing, (2) being released on bail, (3) having a
hired attorney rather than assigned counsel or no attorney, (4) being
subjected to relatively long delay while in jail if not released on bail,
(5) receiving a jury trial, (6) being dismissed or being acquitted, (7)
receiving probation or a suspended sentence if convicted, and (8) re-
ceiving a relatively short sentence if jailed. One could generalize the
disadvantaged or disfavored pattern to include personal injury and di-
vorce cases by defining it as a pattern of court behavior in which there
is harshness or relative deprivation in both the decisional outcomes and
judicial processing of those groups which a society considers to be so-
cially inferior.
The second discriminatory pattern or syndrome might be called
the paternalistic pattern. It particularly applies to juveniles under age
21 as contrasted to adults. In criminal proceedings, it involves unfavor-
able treatment with regard to such safeguards for the innocent as having
an attorney or having a jury trial. It involves favorable treatment, how-
ever, with regard to being kept out of jail pending trial, not being con-
victed, and not being sentenced to jail if convicted. One could generalize
the paternalism pattern to include personal injury and divorce cases by
defining it as a pattern of court behavior in which there is favoritism
for the weak in the reluctance to impose negative sanctions, and dis-
favoritism in the awarding or enforcing of monetary awards and in the
informality of judicial processing.
When female criminal defendants are compared with male crim-
inal defendants, the treatment pattern fits the paternalistic mold much
more closely than the disadvantaged mold as is indicated in table 1.
The table separates the cases into those in which the single charge
against the defendant was grand larceny (the most common felony
against property) and those in which the charge was felonious assault
(the most common felony against persons). This property-persons
breakdown was made because it was important in understanding the
differential treatment found between urban courts (which tend to be
relatively more sensitive to crimes against persons) and rural courts
(which tend to be more sensitive to crimes against property).5 The
property-persons breakdown was also important in understanding the
differential sentencing of blacks who commit larceny (which tends to
be a crime between races) and blacks who commit assault (which
tends to be a crime within races).
6
5. Id. at 98-101.
6. Id. at 94. See also M. WOLFGANG, CRIME AND RACE: CONCEPTIONS AND
MISCONCEPTIONS (1964).
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The paternalistic discrimination against and for women (like juve-
niles), however, applied almost equally in grand larceny and felonious
assault cases. Relative to men though, women were somewhat more
likely to be jailed in assault cases than in larceny cases. This may be
due to the fact that assault is a more manly crime than larceny (as
shown by the ratio of male to female defendants in the top and bottom
halves of table 1), and women are therefore treated more like men
when they commit assault than when they commit larceny.
Within the larceny cases (section I) and the assault cases (sec-
tion II), the data is broken down between the chronological stages
that relate to being jailed before or after conviction (rows 1 through
5) and the stages which emphasize formal safeguards for the innocent
(rows 6 through 8).7  Blacks and indigents are particularly discrimi-
nated against when it comes to being released on bail. Just the opposite
discrimination is evident for women. Of the 63 female larceny-defend-
ants, 76 percent were released on bail; whereas of the 771 male larceny-
defendants, only 50 percent were released on bail, giving a difference of
26 percentage points (section I, row 1). This difference is in conform-
ity with the paternalism pattern which shuns keeping juveniles and
women in jail pending trial or after conviction. The same jail avoid-
ance phenomenon pending trial can be observed for assault cases where
a 19 percentage points difference is present (section II, row 1).
Likewise, women are given more lenient treatment than men if
they are convicted. In grand larceny cases, 64 percent of the women
received a suspended sentence or probation, whereas only 43 percent of
the men did so (section I, row 4). A related although weaker dif-
ference is shown for the felonious assault cases (section II, row 4). Of
those defendants who actually spent time in jail, there were too few
women (20 or less)" in the sample to make meaningful comparisons
7. No data was compiled on the arrest stage prior to the preliminary hearing.
Women, however, may be arrested for some crimes that equally guilty men are not ar-
rested for (e.g., prostitution), and men may be arrested for some crimes that equally
guilty women are not (e.g., statutory rape). KANOWiTZ, supra note 1, at 15-25. Like-
wise no data were compiled on the parole stage subsequent to sentencing. Women,
however, may be more readily paroled than men for similar crimes (as indicated by
their more readily receiving pretrial release and postconviction probation), although im-
prisoned women may represent a subsample of women who are particularly high recidi-
visits. While in prison, women may also be treated differently than men. See D. WARD
& G. KASSENBAUM, WOMEN'S PRISON (1965); Tittle, Inmate Organization: Sex Differen-
tiation and the Influence of Criminal Subcultures, 34 AM. Soc. REV. 492 (1969).
8. Twenty was used as a cut-off partly to make theoretical sense out of the data
presented and partly because Guilford says: "If one asks, How small is N before we have
a small sample? . .. Some place it is as low as 20." J. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL
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with men as to the length of the pretrial jailing (rows 2) or the length
of postconviction imprisonment (rows 5).9 Possibly as a means of
avoiding the imprisonment of women and avoiding the stigma of a
criminal record, a lesser percentage of them are convicted than their
male counterparts. Thus, it is indicated that 24 percent of the women
were acquitted or had their larceny cases dismissed, whereas only 13
percent of the men did (section I, row 3). A similar difference is
present for assault cases (section II, row 3).
When it comes to formal safeguards for the innocent, namely hav-
ing a lawyer and having a jury trial, the favorable balance toward
juveniles and women tends to tip in the other direction. Indeed until
the case of In re Gault, juveniles in many states did not have a right to
court-provided counsel.'0 They still do not have a constitutional right
to a jury trial.1 Since In re Gault, although the law has changed,
empirical studies have shown that juveniles are still more easily per-
suaded against exercising and are more reluctant to exercise their right
to counsel than are adults."2
Table 1, however, does not show a discriminatory pattern with
regard to having a lawyer when women defendants are compared with
men defendants in either larceny cases or assault cases (rows 7). The
STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 217 (4th ed. 1956). Guilford also says that
special statistics should be used when any frequency is expected by chance to be less than
10. Id. at 234-35. If the number of females on a row is 20 or less, then by chance 10 or
less should receive favorable treatment, and 10 or less unfavorable.
9. There would have been more imprisoned men and women on row 5 if con-
victed defendants ordered to serve indeterminate sentences had been included. Inde-
terminate sentences were excluded because they lack preciseness for making compari-
sons, unless one obtains data on time actually served, or unless one somewhat arbi-
trarily translates indeterminate sentences into determinate ones by averaging the mini-
mum and maximum when those two figures are available. Of the 363 women in the
total sample of 11,258 cases who received sentences, 27 percent received indeterminate
sentences; while 35 percent of the 5,898 men who received sentences received indetermi-
nate ones. Such sentences are associated with more serious crimes (e.g., murder and
arson) which men are more likely to commit relative to women than the less serious
crimes (e.g., bad checks). Even when the crime is held constant, however, the above
data shows men usually receive a slightly higher percentage of indeterminate sentences.
Such sentences generally have higher maximums and sometimes even higher minimums
than the fixed sentences for the same crimes and probably result in longer prison stays.
These indeterminate-sentence findings are thus consistent with the fixed-sentence find-
ings in that under both types of sentences, women tend to receive shorter sentences than
men.
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
12. Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its
Implementation, 3 L & Soc. REv. 491 (1969).
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percentage differences are 3 and 1, respectively, and are too small to
explain.13 Likewise, no discrimination is observed with regard to
receiving preliminary hearings (rows 6) although they are probably
not as important a safeguard for the innocent as having counsel or a
jury trial.
14
Women, however, in conformity with the paternalism hypothesis,
are less likely to receive the formal treatment of a jury trial than are
men, at least in assault cases where the difference was 26 percent
(section II, row 8). This disparity is contrary to the interests of
women since juries are generally less likely to convict than are judges.'"
Conviction by a jury normally requires the unanimous agreement of
twelve persons which is usually more difficult for a prosecutor to
achieve than convincing a single judge. One disadvantage of jury trial
is that a time-conscious prosecutor may have greater desire to recom-
mend a longer sentence for a jury-convicted defendant than for one
who pleaded guilty or took a relatively quick bench trial. The Uni-
versity of Chicago Jury Project research shows that both juries and
judges tend to favor women in criminal verdicts, but juries do so to a
greater degree.' 6
If juveniles and females are treated paternally in criminal cases
13. The cut-off level in this article is between differences that are too small to
explain (7 percent and under) and differences that merit an explanation (9 percent and
over). A percentage difference of 8 is the gray area in terms of making theoretical
sense out of the empirical data presented.
A difference of approximately 8 percent is attributable to chance less than 5 times
out of 100 if the total sample size on which it is based (males plus females) is about 150.
GUILFORD, supra note 8, at 178-82, 190-92, and 538-39. The smallest total samples in
tables 1, 2, and 4 tend to be as large as or larger than 150. Such a probability calculation
assumes one has hypothesized the direction of the difference between males and females
as has been done in the tables in light of the paternalism hypothesis. Id. at 207-08.
14. Of these three safeguards, only preliminary hearings have not been made a
due process right for adults by the Supreme Court. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968) (jury trial), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel). For a discussion of the functions of preliminary hearings, defense counsel
and jury trials see D. FELLMANN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS (1958); L. ORFIELD, CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL (1947).
15. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-65 (1966).
16. Id. at 191-218. Juries relative to judges may be especially sympathetic to
women relative to men in more serious crimes and also in less manly crimes. This might
explain why the lawyers of women defendants asked for jury trials more in grand lar-
ceny cases than in felonious assault cases. Larceny is generally a more serious crime
bringing a more severe sentence, as indicated by comparing the percentages on row 5
(length of sentence) of the larceny section with row 5 of the assault section. Larceny
is also a less manly crime, as indicated by the female to male ratio in the larceny and as-
sault sections of table 1.
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(meaning favoritism on jailing and discrimination on jury trial and
counsel), then female juveniles are probably treated the most paternally
and male adults the least paternally. That is the finding when one
uses the American Bar Foundation data to correlate sex and treatment
of persons under 21 (while controlling for felonious larceny or as-
sault) although few female juveniles were included in the data.1 7  Be-
tween these two outer categories of paternalism, the categories of male
juveniles and female adults are treated about equally, although male
juveniles are less likely to have an attorney, jury trial, or preliminary
hearing; whereas the female adults are more likely to be kept out of
jail before and after conviction.
When the American Bar Foundation data is used to correlate race
and treatment of women defendants, it appears that white women are
less likely to be jailed before or after conviction than black women, but
they are also less likely to have a lawyer. White women thereby better
fit the paternalistic mold. With respect to having a lawyer, however,
the data may reflect the greater likelihood of whites being nonindigent
and thereby ineligible for court-appointed counsel.18  Black women
(unlike black men) do receive more favorable treatment than white
men with regard to being jailed before or after conviction, when con-
trolling for felonious larceny or assault. When sexual paternalism and
racial discrimination are mixed, the results as to receiving a jury trial
follow no consistent pattern.
Looking at table 1 from an overall perspective and integrating
17. Where the sample sizes are large enough to compare length of postconviction
incarceration of female and male juveniles, female juveniles on the average are confined
about two months longer when the nature of the crime is not held constant between fe-
males and males. CHILDRENS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WE.L-
FARE, STATISTICS ON PUBILC INSTITUTIONS FOR DELINQUENTS (1970). The longer
confinement is generally justified on the grounds that young girls are more in need of
protection, especially sexually, from the outside world than young boys are. See K. Ol-
son, For Her Own Protection: A Case Study of the Conditions of Incarceration for Fe-
male Juvenile Offenders in the State of Connecticut, 1971 (unpublished paper, Yale Law
School). In the Connecticut juvenile data, the main commitment reasons for boys were
breaking and entering (33 percent), theft (22 percent), and car theft (20 percent);
whereas for girls the main reasons were runaway (30 percent), pregnancy (16 percent),
and sexual misconduct (15 percent). There were too few boys and girls committed for
the same reason to be able to hold the "crime" constant.
18. The correlation coefficient is +.16 being white and being nonindigent in the
1,949 state criminal cases on which table 1 is based, and the correlation is +.20 between
being nonindigent and lacking an attorney. The correlation is +1.00 between being
classified as nonindigent and not having a court-appointed attorney in the federal data.
These correlation coefficients are numbers similar in meaning to those in the "Differ-
ence" column of table 1 although the differences in table 1 are not stated as decimals,
and the plus and minus signs are eliminated.
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all of the data, there seems to be a pattern-women are substantially
less likely than men to be subjected to jail before or after trial, but are
less likely to have a jury trial. The differences discussed were of
enough magnitude and based on sufficiently large samples that they
could not readily be attributed to chance. However, some of the dif-
ferences may have arisen from the fact that grand larcenies and felonious
assaults committed by women may be generally less severe than those
committed by men. Therefore, there may be generally less to merit a
jury trial and less to merit a severe sentence when women are involved.
To the extent that the male and female larceny cases are com-
parable, and likewise with the assault cases, differences can possibly
be explained by judicial attitudes which assume that women and juve-
niles are weaker and would therefore be more harmed by pretrial and
postconviction jailing than would men. 19 The empirical data does show
that women and juveniles are less likely to be hardened criminals in the
sense that they are somewhat less likely to have prior records °.2  Like-
wise, judges may feel that both juveniles and women should be treated
in a more informal, more fatherly, less legalistic way, and that jury trials
and defense counsel interfere with such paternalistic informality. To
supplement the behavioral case data of table 1, perhaps future psy-
chological questionnaire studies of judicial attitudes will throw more
light on how judges subjectively view jailing and jury trials for women
defendants. 2
The few statutes which provide different sentences for women
and men generally provide for more indeterminate sentences for
women, 22 just as juvenile statutes provide more indeterminate sentences
19. Judges may also give shorter sentences to women than to men convicted of
the same crimes because judges think the weaker nature of women also makes them (1)
less dangerous to society, (2) more deterred from repeating their crime, and (3) more
easily rehabilitated. These points are in conformity with the custodial, deterrence, and
rehabilitation goals of imprisonment.
20. NAGEL, supra note 4, at 111. The correlation between being a man and hav-
ing a prior record, however, was only +.08 in the federal data, and prior record was un-
available for the defendants in the state data.
21. A questionnaire answered by 118 state and federal supreme court judges who
were serving in 1955, contained the statement that "women are not the equals of men in
intelligence and organizing ability." Seventeen percent of the judges agreed, and 73 per-
cent disagreed. Nagel, Off-the-Bench Judicial Attitudes, in JumciAL DECISION-MAKING
29, 32, 53 (G. Schubert ed. 1963). No questions were asked, however, which specifi-
cally dealt with judicial attitudes toward the jailing of women and jury trials for women
defendants. Only 12 percent of a Pationwide sample of state legislators agreed with the
same questionnaire item. NAGEL, supra note 4, at 199, 205.
22. See note I supra and the statutes discussed in Commonwealth v. Daniels, 430
Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8
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for juveniles. 23 Legislators probably think that both women and juve-
niles are more susceptible to rehabilitation than are males and adults,
and that indeterminate sentences contingent on prison progress facilitate
rehabilitation. Testing that hypothesis would require determining legis-
lators' attitudes, although it is probable that the more important atti-
tudes concerning increasing or decreasing sexual discrimination are held
by the judges who apply criminal statutes that allow for discretion.
2 4
Women as Personal Injury Plaintiffs
In personal injury cases, the real defendant is usually an insur-
ance company and thus has no male or female sex, just as the state as
plaintiff in criminal cases cannot meaningfully be labeled male or fe-
male. Plaintiffs in personal injury cases, however, are sometimes male
and sometimes female. What does the empirical data show with re-
gard to their relative treatment?
First it should be noted that the paternalism hypothesis which
made some sense in explaining, or at least integrating, data on the treat-
ment of women as criminal defendants does not make sense if applied
in the same way to women as personal injury plaintiffs. Personal in-
jury plaintiffs are not in jeopardy of being placed in jail or of being
stigmatized with criminal records. The basic issue is whether they
should be given a monetary award in a society that has limited mone-
tary resources thereby necessitating priorities. If women are disfavored
in receiving monetary awards in society in general, one would expect
a similar pattern of negative discrimination to be present in personal
injury cases. However, if the paternalism hypothesis is defined as
favoritism of the weak when imposing negative sanctions but disfavor-
itism when awarding or enforcing monetary awards, then either the
paternalism or disadvantaged hypothesis would apply and would predict
discrimination against women personal-injury plaintiffs.
Just as there were separate stages at which discrimination could
occur in criminal cases, so also there are separate stages in personal
(D. Conn. 1968). Even if both women and men are subject to indeterminate sentences,
the average sentences given and especially served may differ. See notes 7, 9 & 17 supra.
23. D. TA-T, CRIMINOLOGY 618 (1950).
24. After this article was written, a New York Times study headlined: "Crime
Rate of Women up Sharply Over Men's." N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, at 1, col.
1. The article quotes Phil Levin, a social work consultant to the Dallas police, as
saying, "We in the criminal justice system are becoming less tolerant of women. They
are becoming apprehended more frequently and not sheltered as in the past." Id. at 72,
col. 5. This may portend decreased paternalism toward women criminal defendants
in the future.
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injury cases. The first stage, analogous to being arrested in criminal
cases, involves filing a personal injury complaint. One study of the
economics of personal injury cases compiled data on the background
characteristics of auto accident victims in the state of Michigan who
subsequently became personal injury claimants. 25  The key sex data
(summarized on row 1 of table 2) shows that of 166 seriously injured
male accident victims, 38 percent filed suit; whereas of 178 seriously
injured female accident victims, only 30 percent filed suit. The abso-
lute difference of 8 percentage points represents a 27 percent relative
increase from the 30 percent base.26
The reason a smaller percentage of female victims than male vic-
tims filed suit might be due (1) to a possibly higher rate of precom-
plaint settlements where females are involved or (2) to a possible tend-
ency of females to suffer slighter injuries than males. Perhaps a more
meaningful explanation is that women are encouraged to be less ag-
gressive in asserting their legal rights in personal injury cases, just as
they may be less aggressive in asserting their right to trial by jury in
criminal cases.
Once a suit is filed, the next stage is establishing the defendant's
liability to the plaintiff. In the Department of Transportation study of
personal injury claims, nationwide data shows virtually no difference
between males and females with regard to the likelihood of their re-
spective claims being paid when bench, jury, and nontrial cases are
lumped together (row 2) .27 Also, there is no difference between male
and female victory percentages in jury-trial cases, at least when adult
and minor plaintiffs are lumped together (row 3). This data comes
from the nationwide compilation of the Jury Verdict Research Corpo-
ration of Cleveland, Ohio.28 It further shows that there is a lower vic-
25. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ, R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 259 (1964).
26. Relative percentages are shown in table 2 so as to provide a common measure
for comparing: (1) differences between percentages like those on row 1; and (2) d;f-
ferences between dollar amounts like those on row 7. An increase of 10 percentage
points also means more if one starts at 5 percent than if one starts at 80 percent. Where
a relative percentage can be calculated, its size is referred to in determining whether the
discrimination hypothesis seems to be confirmed.
27. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 15
(1970).
28. 4 JURY VERDICT RESEARCH CORP., PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS,
REP. No. 41, at 2025-26 (1964) [hereinafter cited JVR]. Sometimes the JVR Hand-
books do not give the exact sample size of female or male plaintiffs on which their per-
centages or dollar amounts are based as indicated by the dashes in columns 2 and 3 of
table 2, but the sample sizes are generally quite substantial in view of the extensive data
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tory rate for both sexes in cases that have to go to a jury decision (row
3) as contrasted to cases that are settled with or without a trial (row
2), possibly because the nontrial cases more clearly favor the plaintiff.
A discriminatory pattern begins to appear if one compares adult
male plaintiffs with adult female plaintiffs (row 4) since adult male
plaintiffs win 76 percent of their jury trials and adult female plaintiffs
win 69 percent of theirs.29 Sexual discrimination is possibly less prev-
alent in comparing girl minors and boy minors than in comparing
women adults and men adults since minors (especially pre-teenage
minors) probably tend to be perceived as children, whereas adults tend
to be perceived as women and men. One can also readily see that both
male and female adults have a better chance of winning than male and
female children (comparing row 4 and row 3), probably because
child plaintiffs often negligently contribute to their injuries and because
juries identify more with the adult defendant than the child plaintiff.
Once liability has been established, the next stage conceptually
(although the two may occur concurrently) involves determining the
amount of money to be awarded. Little difference appears in the aver-
age amount awarded to male and female plaintiffs when adults and
minors are lumped together (row 5, like row 3) although a small per-
centage difference may involve a substantial number of dollars.30
When adult female plaintiffs are compared to adult male plaintiffs, the
pattern of amounts awarded is more favorable to men (row 6, like row
4).31 Males averaged 6 percent above the expected awards to plain-
tiffs for similar types of injuries, medical expenses, and lost wages
whereas females averaged 2 percent below what would be expected.
The more interesting male-female comparisons relate to specific
kinds of personal injuries rather than to personal injuries in general.
For example, when husbands sue for their losses caused by their wives'
injuries, they collect more than wives collect when wives sue for their
losses caused by their husbands' injuries (row 7).32 This is so in spite
of the fact, as previously shown (row 6), that when women sue for
their own injuries they tend to collect less than do men. In other words,
men collect (1) more for their own injuries and (2) more vicariously
collected unless the JVR Handbooks indicate otherwise. For an analysis of the con-
cepts and methods of the Jury Verdict Research Corporation see Nagel, Statistical Pre-
diction of Verdicts and Awards, 1963 MODERN UsEs OF LOGIc IN LAw 135.
29. 6 JVR, REP. No. 62, at 3451-56 (1966).
30. 4 JVR, REP. No. 41, at 2027-29 (1964).
31. 6 JVR, REP. No. 62, at 3451-56 (1966).
32. 2 JVR, REP. No. 113, at 555, 567-68 (1969).
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for injuries to their women than women collect vicariously for injuries
to their men. Note also that there are more than eleven times as many
sample suits by husbands for the losses of their wives' services than by
wives for the losses of their husbands' services (row 7). The 28 wife-
plaintiff suits represent a big increase from the 1964 Jury Verdict Re-
search Report which showed only 3 such cases. Indeed, in some states
the law still allows only husbands, not wives, to sue for the loss of a
spouse's services, this stemming from a time when wives were almost
considered property of their husbands. 3
The generally larger amounts awarded to male plaintiffs (row 6)
may be partially explained by the greater earning power of males,
temporarily or permanently reduced by the injury. Personal injury
juries have no control over this factor which reflects employment and
educational discrimination against women. The most permanently dam-
aging injury is death, and as expected men are valued there more
highly than women (row 8). 4  The difference, however, may be less
than anticipated because a wife-plaintiff seeking to collect for a killed
husband as contrasted to a husband-plaintiff is seeking to collect for a
killed wife, thereby mixing discrimination as to the victim's sex with
favoritism as to the plaintiff's sex.
There are some injuries that are not generally relevant to one's
work capacity, and therefore differences in the amounts awarded to
male and female plaintiffs for such injuries cannot be readily explained
in terms of differential earning power. Urino-genital injuries are an
example since probably few men or women in the Jury Verdict sample
made a living from their genitalia, and if they did, they probably would
not have so informed the jury. Nevertheless, the inequality pattern here
was greater than it was with any other type of bodily injury. The aver-
age male plaintiff who won a urino-genital injury case in the sample
studied collected $31,966, whereas the average female plaintiff in similar
cases collected only $11,835 (row 9).11 This represents an absolute
difference of $20,131 or a relative difference of 170 percent. In other
words, male genitalia seem to have been valued almost three times as
much as female genitalia. This may be an indication of a sexist view
in the American court system. Much of the difference, however, may
be due to the fact that urino-genital damage to the male rather than the
33. KANOWITZ, supra note 1, at 80-85, 160, 167.
34. Compare 2 JVR, REP. No. 102, at 425-26b (1969) with id., REP. No. 100,
at 407-08b (1968).
35. Compare 2 JVR, REP. No. 116, at 850-52 (1970) with id., RaP. No. 117,
at 865-65b (1970).
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female plaintiffs is usually more severe and more likely to be per-
manent.36
Looking at table 2 from an overall perspective integrating all the
data, there seems to be a pattern in which adult women are less likely
than men to file suits, to establish liability, or to receive a relatively
high award, especially for certain types of injury. In that regard, the
possible discrimination pattern of women plaintiffs is more like that of
black plaintiffs than juvenile plaintiffs. In personal injury cases, chil-
dren,17 blacks, 38 and women, in that order, have greater difficulty estab-
lishing liability than adults, whites, and men. Thus, given this order
of discrimination against children, blacks, and women on a victory rate
continuum, women plaintiffs are closer in treatment to blacks than to
children. Women, however, are closer to children than to blacks on a
damages-awarded continuum with blacks furthest behind.
The extent to which women are less likely than men to establish
liability and also to collect higher damages for similar injuries can
probably be traced back to employment and educational discrimina-
tion, to the traditional subordination of women in the family, to a ra-
tioning of limited monetary resources, and in some cases to Freudian
castration and other sexual anxieties (possibly indicated in the genitalia
award comparisons). As these possible causal factors diminish through
societal alad legal change, the differential victory rates and damages
awarded should become more equal.
Women as Divorce Litigants
Prevailing public opinion may conceive of divorce cases as a mani-
festation of female domination or even exploitation of men since only
36. Id. If females who lose their child-bearing ability in an accident could be
compared with males who lose their propagating ability, the damages awarded would
probably be more equal since severity and permanence would be held constant and since
women have been especially valued in society for their child-bearing ability.
Although one might think women would receive higher awards for facial scarring
injuries than men, given society's emphasis on feminine beauty, the average awards for
both sexes are about equal although the especially high awards tend to go to women.
6 JVR, REP. No. 70, at 127-29F (1966).
37. The victory rate for children under 12 is 46 percent versus 61.3 percent for
plaintiffs in general. If children collect anything, they tend to either get very little or
very much as compared to the general population. Their very small and large damage
awards, however, give them an average award close to the general population if they col-
lect. 5 JVR, REP. No. 45, at 3025-32 (1964).
38. The victory rate for blacks is 57 percent as compared to 61.3 percent for
plaintiffs in general. Damage awards to black plaintiffs average 15 percent lower than
to plaintiffs in general. 5 JVR, REP. No. 43, at 2076-79 (1964).
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women litigants normally seek and obtain alimony or child support.39 In
spite of this, empirical data on women as divorce litigants may show
actual male domination and exploitation.
Although women tend to be the formal plaintiffs in divorce
cases, 40 existing data indicates that this is a nominal status, and that
the husband in reality takes the de facto rather than the de jure initia-
tive in dissolving the marriage. 41  Among the poor, desertion by the
husband is a frequent substitute for divorce and is a major cause of
eligibility for welfare aid.42  The fact that wives seem to have better
formal grounds for divorce and thus become the plaintiff-complainants
possibly shows greater provocation on the part of husbands. 43  Al-
though women have become more independent as a result of increased
employment opportunities, they are still more economically dependent
on their husbands than vice versa, and they would therefore tend to
resist divorce if it were not for their husbands' cruelty, nonsupport, de-
sertion, or other provocation.
44
39. Hofstadter & Herzog, Common Sense About Alimony, HARPERS, May 1958, at
68; Lobseng, Are Divorce and Alimony Unlair to Men? READER'S DIGEST, Oct. 1959, at
193.
40. In a 1963 sample of divorce cases in 22 states, wives were plaintiffs in 72 per-
cent of the cases, and husbands were plaintiffs in 28 percent. DIVISION OF VITAL
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, DIVORCE STATISTICS ANALY-
sis 39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as HEW, DIVORCE STATISTICS].
41. On the basis of extensive interviewing of a sample of 425 divorced women,
Goode concludes that "the husband more frequently than the wife is the first to desire a
divorce; and . . . it is the husband more often than the wife who adopts (whether con-
sciously or not) a line of behavior, a 'strategy,' which forces the other spouse to suggest
a divorce as the appropriate solution." W. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 133 (1956).
42. Seventy-six percent of the 1,300,000 families receiving benefits under the aid
to families with dependent children program in 1967 involved families where the father
was absent from the home. NAT'L CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, FINDINGS OF THE 1967 AFDC STUDY: DATA BY
STATE AND CENSUS DIVISION, pt. 1, table 22 (1970). Categories of absence include de-
sertion (18 percent), nonmarriage to the mother (28 percent), divorce (13 percent), sep-
aration (12 percent), and imprisonment (3 percent). Id. In 35 percent of the families,
the father's whereabouts were unknown. Id., table 24. On middle class desertion see L
Weitzman, Social Suicide: A Study of Missing Persons, June 1970 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation in Columbia University Library).
43. An alternative explanation for why wives are often made the plaintiff in di-
vorce cases is because both husband and wife realize the wife has a better chance of
winning. In divorce cases where decrees were granted, the wife as plaintiff lost only
about 2 percent of the time (i.e., the husband was granted the decree); whereas the hus-
band as plaintiff lost about 10 percent of the time (i.e., the wife was granted the decree).
HEW, DIVORCE STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 39.
44. The formal legal grounds given in a 1963 nationwide sample of divorce de-
crees are cruelty (54 percent), non-support (19 percent), desertion (18 percent), and
indignities (16 percent). Other grounds are less than 3 percent. Grounds may be
multiple. HEW, DIVORCE STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 49.
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In descriptions of the divorce trial process, there are references
to the often degrading paternalistic procedures to which women liti-
gants are subjected. 45  Begging for alimony may be particularly de-
grading even if alimony is considered (1) income accrued as a result
of inadequately compensated wifehood and motherhood and (2) pay-
ment for obtaining educational rehabilitation and training."' Seeking
child support may also be a frustrating ordeal even if judges recognize
the concept as covering (1) some of the considerable work mothers
must do in caring for children and (2) some of the considerable out-of-
pocket expenses involved in raising children which husbands have
fathered. In custody disputes, a double standard of morality may pre-
vail which condemns extramarital activities by wives, but tolerates them
by husbands.417 In some states this double standard allows husbands
to obtain divorces on sexual grounds which are not available to wives.
48
The real test of possible discrimination in the judicial process,
however, is not at the initiation or suit-filing stages or even at the judg-
ment stage, but rather at the judgment-enforcement stage. To a lesser
extent, this reasoning also applies to personal injury and criminal cases,
but a much higher percentage of the results of those cases are deter-
mined at the presentencing and predamages stages. In addition, data
does not seem to be available on the collection of personal injury dam-
ages by sex as contrasted to the awarding of damages, or on the paroling
of convicts by sex. Data is available, however, showing what happens
to monetary judgments awarded to women divorce litigants.
Table 3 shows the probability of a divorced woman collecting any
child support money. It is based on data gathered by Kenneth Eck-
hardt from a 1955 sample of fathers who were ordered in divorce de-
crees to pay child support in a metropolitan Wisconsin county.49 Within
45. Tomasson, Women as Property, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 19, 1970, at 15.
46. On the goals to be served by alimony and child support, see H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 14.1, .5, at 441-42 (alimony),
§ 15.1 (child support) (1968).
47. At first glance, it may appear to be a victory for the wife to obtain custody of
(and responsibility for) the children which she does about 95 percent of the time. W.
GOODE, supra note 41, at 311. Husbands, however, admitted that they agreed with the
custody decrees 85 percent of the time. Id. at 313.
48. KANOWITZ, supra note 1, at 96-98. For example, a common provision allows
husbands to divorce wives who were pregnant at the time of the marriage, but wives can-
not divorce husbands who have made other women pregnant at the time of the marriage.
Id. at 96.
49.. Eckhardt, Deviance, Visibility, and Legal Action: The Duty to Support, 15
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 470 (1968).
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TABLE 3
The Probability of a Divorced Woman Collecting Any Child Support Money
(by years since the court order)
Non-Paying Fathers
Years Since Number of Full Partial No against whom legal
court order open cases Compliance Compliance Compliance action was taken
One 163 38% 20% 42% 19%
Two 163 28 20 52 32
Three 161 26 14 60 21
Four 161 22 11 67 18
Five 160 19 14 67 9
Six 158 17 12 71 6
Seven 157 17 12 71 4
Eight 155 17 8 75 2
Nine 155 17 8 75 0
Ten 149 13 8 79 1
Based on data from Kenneth Eckhardt, "Deviance, Visibility, and Legal Action: The
Duty to Support," 15 Social Problems 470, 473-474 (1968).
one year after the divorce decrees, only 38 percent of the fathers were
in full compliance with support orders (row 1). Twenty percent had
only partially complied, and in some cases partial compliance only
constituted a single payment. Forty-two percent of the fathers made
no payment at all. By the tenth year, the number of open cases had
dropped from 163 to 149 as a result of the death of fathers, the termina-
tion of parental rights, or the maturity of children. By that year, only
13 percent of the fathers were fully complying, and 79 percent of
the fathers were in total noncompliance.
If noncompliance is so great with child support orders, it is prob-
ably even greater with alimony orders although alimony orders are rela-
tively infrequent. 50 It should be noted that the original child support
orders probably did not meet the full support needs of the children.5
50. In an analysis of 12,000 Chicago divorce cases, the wife requested postdivorce
alimony in only 7 percent of the cases and waived it in 93 percent. M. VIRTUE, FAMILY
CASES IN COURT 92 (1956). In 1922, which is the last year the Census Bureau kept ali-
mony data, their data showed alimony was decreed in 15 percent of a nationwide sample
of decrees although women were less independent at that time than in the 1950's. P.
JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 126 (1959). For an in-depth analysis of
alimony and other matters in a sample of 40 Kansas divorce cases, see Hopson, The
Economics of a Divorce: A Pilot Empirical Study at the Trial Court Level, 11 KAN.
L. REV. 107 (1962).
51. The smallness of child support and property settlements in divorce decrees is
discussed with empirical data in W. GOODE, supra note 41, at 218-23. Of 172,000 minor
children involved in divorces in Chicago in 1949-50, one third were awarded no child
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Some of the orders may also have been further reduced judicially when
the father re-married, or when his financial status otherwise worsened.
Thus, if only a minority of husbands pay anything and even those pay
a substantially less-than-full support order, most child support is ac-
tually carried by the mother or by the state.
In spite of available sanctions like contempt of court, civil action,
and criminal prosecution, and in spite of the state's incentive to avoid
unnecessary welfare payments, legal action is seldom initiated against
nonpaying fathers (last column of table 3). This is so especially as
children grow older and probably require even more support money.
Only 19 percent of the 101 nonpaying fathers at the end of the first
year had legal action taken against them, and only one percent of the
128 nonpaying fathers in the tenth year. Indeed, of all criminal and
civil court orders, monetary divorce awards (and small claims judg-
ments)52 .are probably the least complied with and the least enforced.
The explanation for the nonenforcement is not that fathers are un-
able to comply since: (1) support orders consider the ability of the
father to pay; and (2) Eckhardt's data shows that less able working-
class fathers are more likely to be prosecuted than more able middle-
class fathers because (a) their ex-wives are more likely to be on wel-
fare and (b) they are more likely to already have criminal records. 5
A possible explanation for nonenforcement lies in the promale bias of
the prosecutors, judges, and legislators who could more meaningfully
enforce the law. An additional explanation may be the greater com-
plexity of nonsupport cases (especially where interstate enforcement
in involved) and the greater age of such claims compared to other, more
current cases.
More vigorous prosecution may not be a realistic remedy for the
nonenforcement of child support orders, although it may be merited in
flagrant cases. Instead, a dignity-preserving system of social insurance
might more effectively cover the situation. The concept of survivorship
under social security could be expanded to include children of a de-
serted or divorced father as well as a deceased father.54 Other social
support at all. Robson, The Law and Practice of Divorce-The Judge's Point of View,
in UNrvERsIy OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE 4 (Conference Ser.
No. 9, 1952).
52. L. Weitzman, Non-Compliance with Small Claims Court Orders (forthcom-
ing). The legal actions referred to in Table 3 are contempt proceedings for noncompli-
ance with the divorce decree, rather than prosecution for nonsupport.
53. Eckhardt, supra note 49, at 475.
54. A. SCHORR, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL POLICY 21-68 (1968).
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alternatives include child allowances, negative income tax, or an ex-
panded family assistance plan.5" A national program of wholesome day-
care centers56 and government stimulation of employment opportuni-
tieS5 7 would also enable women to work who wish to do so, rather than
to rely on child support or welfare.
The Effect of the Sex of the Jury
The unequal treatment of male and female litigants may be af-
fected by whether the judge is a man or a woman and by whether the
jury is predominantly male or female.58 Because there are few female
judges, and no data found comparing them with male judges vis-a-vis
male and female litigants, this section of the article will deal solely
with male and female jurors, but one can possibly extrapolate the find-
ings to male and female judges.59 Likewise, because of the rare oc-
currence of jury trials in divorce cases, there seems to be no data avail-
able on how male-dominated juries differ from female-dominated juries
vis-a-vis male and female divorce litigants. 60
There are five meaningful hypotheses which one can formulate
concerning the effect of the sex of jurors on male-female treatment in
criminal and personal injury cases. One hypothesis, which may be
called the opposites-attract hypothesis, predicts that men will favor
women and women will favor men.61 A second, the chivalry hypothe-
55. See Family Assistance Act of 1971, H.R. 6020, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY 281-317 (P. Dodyk, gen. ed. 1969).
56. See F. RUDERMAN, CHILD CARE AND WORKING MOTHERS (1968); Special Is-
sue on Day Care, 44 CHILD WELFARE 124 (1965).
57. See C. WILCOX, TOWARD SOCIAL WELFARE: AN ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMS AND
PROPOSALS ATTACKING POVERTY, INSECURITY, AND INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 103-17,
179-92, 211-27, 291-329 (1969).
58. The concern here is only with the effect on sexual discrimination (not on sen-
tences or awards in general) of changing the sexual representation of judicial decision-
makers. Studies that deal with the effect on sentences or awards in general are not di-
rectly relevant. Such studies include R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF IN-
SANITY 109 (1967) which shows that housewives are less punitive than men in burglary
and possibly other theft cases, but more punitive in father-daughter incest and possibly
other male-female sex crimes.
59. For a comparison of the effects of various background characteristics (other
than sex) on the decisional propensities of judges (rather than jurors), see NAGEL, supra
note 4, at 227-44.
60. "Of several thousand divorce cases [in Chicago], juries were used in only
three." M. VIRTUE, supra note 50, at 58.
61. A. White, Selecting the Jury, in SUCCESSFUL JURY TRIALS: A SYMPOSIUM
119, 123 (J. Appleman ed. 1952) says: "If you are representing a personable young man,
try to seat kindly old ladies in the jury box. If you are representing an attractive young
woman, have as many male jurors, old or young, as possible."
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sis, predicts that men will favor women and women will also favor
women because supposedly women need special treatment. Third is
the brainwashing hypothesis which says that men will be favored by
both men and women because they have been indoctrinated to believe
that men are more valuable. Fourth is the equality hypothesis which
says men favor neither sex, and women favor neither sex. This is the
implicit or explicit hypothesis of cases which have found no denial of
equal protection in state actions which systematically decrease the
chances of women serving on juries. 62 Fifth is the likes-attract hypoth-
esis which predicts that men favor men, and women favor women.
With regard to criminal cases, the most relevant data seems to be
contained in a quantitative empirical study by Arnold Rose and Arthur
Prell.6 3 A sample of students taking courses in introductory sociology
and social psychology at the University of Minnesota in 1953 were
asked what sentences they would hand down if they were serving as
judges or jurors in a variety of hypothetical fact situations. One situa-
tion involved a male convicted of a certain crime. Elsewhere on the
list, another situation involved a female convicted of the same crime.
The male respondents tended to give the male defendant a lower sen-
tence than the female defendant, whereas the female respondents
tended to give the female defendant a lower sentence than the male
defendant. 64 In other words, men tended to favor males and women
tended to favor females. To the extent this finding can be extrapolated
to real juries or real judges, it confirms the likes-attract hypothesis.
With regard to personal injury cases, there is data available on
real, not just simulated, juries. Table 4 presents data from the Jury
Verdict Research Corporation on how the treatment of females and
males differs in personal injury cases when considering the sex of the
jury. The upper half of the table answers the question: "If I know
the sex of the plaintiff, what can I predict with regard to victory and
damages before male-dominated and female-dominated juries?" The
lower half of the table answers the question: "If I know the dominant
sex of the jury, what can I predict with regard to victory and damages
for male and female plaintiffs?"
Both parts of the table show that holding constant the sex of the
jury makes no significant difference with regard to establishing liability.
62. KANowrrz, supra note 1, at 28-31.
63. Rose & Prell, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? A Study in Social Valua-
tion, 61 AM. I. Soc. 247 (1955).
64. Id. at 257.
November 19711 WOMEN AS LITIGANTS


































































THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Both parts, however, show that holding constant the sex of the jury
makes a substantial difference with regard to the average amount
awarded. For instance, male-dominated juries gave awards to male
plaintiffs that averaged 12 percent above the expected average for the
type of injury, medical expenses, and lost wages (row 3); whereas
male-dominated juries gave female plaintiffs awards that averaged 17
percent below the expected average. With female-dominated juries, the
direction of favoritism between female and male plaintiffs was reversed
(row 4). The validity of the likes-attract hypothesis is further rein-
forced by other data on the average amounts awarded (rows 7 and 8).
Note, however, that although women favor women, they do so to a
lesser extent than men favor men.
In table 4 and to a lesser extent in table 2, discrimination, or at
least inequality, between men and women seems to be greater in the
amount of damages awarded than in the establishment of liability.
Some of the difference between these two stages may be attributed to
the fact that extremely large awards (those over $100,000) tend to be
rendered for work accidents resulting in crippling injuries. Relatively
few women are injured in such circumstances. 65 In table 4, however,
the type of injury (e.g., whiplash) and the out-of-pocket expenses are
statistically controlled in calculating percent above or below the ex-
pected average. Some of the difference in liability versus damages may
be due to the fact that the differential earning power rationale only ap-
plies to assessing damages, not to establishing liability, and male jurors
may place more emphasis on that rationale than do female jurors. Much
of the difference may also be attributed to the greater subjectivity in-
volved in determining damages. Thus, prejudice is more easily exer-
cised there than in the more objective legalistic decision of establishing
liability. Likewise, the greater inequality present at bail and sentencing
stages in criminal cases as compared to procedural safeguards may be
partly attributable to the relatively greater subjectivity and lesser legalistic
restraint involved in bail-setting and sentencing.
Since table 4 shows that disparities in the treatment of male and
female litigants can be affected by the sex of the decision-makers, this
should be further reason for society to seek an increase in the number
of women judges and jurors in addition to more democratic repre-
sentation. In order to obtain more women judges, it is necessary to
encourage more women to become law students and eligible lawyers. 6
65. 4 JVR REP. No. 41, at 2027 (1964).
66. Sassower, Women in the Law: The Second Hundred Years, 57 A.B.A.J. 329
(1971); White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1112 (1967).
[Vol. 23
As for jurors, a majority of states by law still allow women to be more
easily excused or exempted from jury service than men, probably re-
sulting in an underrepresentation of women on the juries of those
statesY7 In some states, however, women may already approximate 50
percent of the jurors. A Pennsylvania study showed an unbalance to-
ward male jurors in Lancaster County, an unbalance toward female
jurors in Philadelphia County, and approximate equality in Allegheny
County.68  These wide variations under the same state law seem to
illustrate the empirical importance of local administrators and judges
with regard to jury selection laws.
Conclusions
Looking at tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 from a general overall perspective,
one can conclude that women as litigants do not receive the same treat-
ment that men receive as litigants. In criminal cases, women are much
less likely to be jailed before or after conviction and are also less likely
to have a jury trial than are men charged with the same crime. In per-
sonal injury cases, adult women are less likely to win than adult men, and
they collect substantially smaller awards, especially for certain types
of injuries and especially before male-dominated juries. In divorce
cases, where there is always a woman on one side and a man on the
other, the woman seems to win if one analyzes only divorce decrees; but
she generally loses if one analyzes collection records.
These findings seem consistent with how women are generally
treated in American society. There exists a paternalistic protectiveness,
at least toward white women, that assumes they need sheltering from
manly experiences such as jail and from subjection to the unfriendliness
of overly formal proceedings in criminal or family law cases. At the
same time, however, when it comes to allocating limited valuable re-
sources like personal injury monetary awards or child support money,
67. For a compilation of state laws with respect to jury service by women as of
January 15, 1965, see AmEasCAN WOMEN: THE REPORT OF THE PRESmENT'S COM.MIS-
SION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE COMMISSION 242
(M. Mead & F. Kaplan ed. 1965). See also KANowrTz, supra note 1, at 28-31.
68. Vanderzell, The Jury: A Community Cross-Section, 19 WEST. POL. Q. 136
(1966). In the jury panel list for the Los Angeles courts, women constituted about 63
percent of the names. Holbrook, Composition of Juries as a Group in CiviL JusncE
AND THE JURY 195, 198 (C. Joiner ed. 1962). A majority of Los Angeles attorneys and
judges who were interviewed also indicated they thought women were over-represented
on actual juries. Id. Both Pennsylvania and California are among the minority of states
that do not by law make it easier for women to be excused from jury service. See note
67 supra.
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women are more likely to be slighted than their male counterparts.
Perhaps more equal treatment will be achieved by increasing the
awareness of disparities in the treatment of male and female litigants
and by increasing the representation of women as jury and judicial deci-
sion-makers. More specifically focused changes in the legal system are
needed to improve the legal process for both men and women.
For example, the remedy for disparities in the jailing of women does
not lie in reducing their release on bond or increasing their post-con-
viction imprisonment. Instead, a more socially useful remedy probably
lies in providing pretrial release for all persons, regardless of sex, mainly
on the basis of their likelihood of appearing for trial, possibly using
the quantitative methods devised by the Vera Institute. 69  Likewise,
society needs to provide posttrial sentencing for all persons, regardless of
sex, on the basis of the likely rehabilitation and deterrent effects of im-
prisonment, possibly using a more scientific approach than has hereto-
fore been used in sentencing.
70
Along related lines, the remedy for disparities in personal injury
awards and child support collections probably does not lie in lowering
the damages awarded to males or in more vigorously prosecuting way-
ward fathers. Instead, society may need to try collective action like no-
fault insurance 7 1 and expanded social security. 72  These measures, how-
ever, will probably still not eliminate whatever discrimination exists
against women litigants until discrimination against women in gen-
eral is further decreased in accordance with current trends.
73
69. See D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES (1965); R. GOLDFARB,
RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965); Ares, Rankin & Sturz,
The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38
N.Y.U.L. REV. 67 (1963).
70. N. WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY (1971); PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: THE COURTS 14-36 (1967); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 109-
150 (1963).
71. W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROB-
LEM: AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (1965); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PRO-
TECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
72. See notes 51-52 & the accompanying text supra.
73. For a discussion of current trends concerning general discrimination against
women and the forces responsible for the trends see AMERICAN WOMEN: THE REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1963); C. EPSTEIN &
W. GOODE, THE OTHER HALF: ROADS TO WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1971); W. GOODE,
WORLD REVOLUTION AND FAMILY PATTERNS (1963).
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